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NOTES

Re-evaluating the Status of Flags of

Convenience Under International Law
ABSTRACT

This Note re-examines the role and status offlags of convenience in the
internationalshipping arena. The author argues that universal condemnation offlags of convenience or open ship registration is unwarranted
from legal and factual standpoints. The Note first examines the significance of ship nationality as a means of regulatingconduct on ships when
at sea or in foreign ports. This analysis leads into an examination of the
methods states use to ascribe nationality to vessels. The author then analyzes attempts to impose "genuine link" requirements in several conventions and questions whether such requirements are legitimate under customary international law. The Note then characterizes the various
registrationrequirements of selected nationalistand open registry states.
The Note next examines the economic benefits to shipowners with aflag
of convenience. To attract business, flag of convenience states impose little or no taxes, allow for drastically reduced labor costs, and do not
impose the strict safety standards as do closed registry states. The Note
then analyzes policy reasons againstflags of convenience. Commentators
have criticized open registriesfor being slow in enforcing interniational
agreements aimed to protect whales, prohibit pirate radio broadcasts,
and restrict narcotics smuggling. Labor and environmental concerns
have opposed flags of convenience because these nations have been lax in
imposing the social benefits for the crews and the safety regulationsfor
the ships that industrialized societies require. Several open registry
states, however, recently have taken great strides to alleviate these criticisms. The author concludes that, in light of these strides, the poor reputation offlags of convenience has become outdated and unrealistic.
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INTRODUCTION

For centuries, some shipowners have sought to sail their vessels under
the flags of foreign states. In the early 1700s, for example, Genovese
ships operating along the Peloponnesian peninsula flew the French flag
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to cloak their ships with the protection of a powerful state.' In the
1800s, United States and Latin American slave trading ships flew the
flags of states that had not signed a slave suppression treaty granting
Britain the power on the high seas to board and arrest ships registered
with signatory states.2 In recent years, many shipowners, for a variety of
reasons, continue to fly the flags of foreign states. The primary motivation for shipowners to register a ship under a foreign flag is to seek
direct economic benefits in the form of tax savings and decreased operating costs. Shipowners also are motivated by desires to avoid political or
military conflicts that would interfere with the ship's activities if the ship
flew the national flag of its owner. 3
Today, some flags are easier to fly than others. The easiest and least
restrictive flags are called flags of convenience. These are the flags of
states with "open" registries, which place minimal or no restrictions on
what ship may fly their flag.4 More specifically, flags of convenience
"can be defined as the flag of any country allowing the registration of

1. See B. METAXAS, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 5, 8 (1985). For a discussion of shipowners' use of foreign flags in the Mediterranean during the eighteenth century, see id.
at 8-9.
2. See R. CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE xiii (1981).
3. See Politics Limits International Traffic, LLOYD'S SHIP MANAGER & SHIPPING
NEWS INT'L, DIRECTORY OF INTERNATIONAL SHIP REGISTERS, SHIP MANAGERS AND

MANNING AGENTS (Supp. Nov. 1988) at 5 [hereinafter LLOYD'S SHIP MANAGER].

Some states specifically exclude the vessels of particular states from entering their ports.
Israeli ships, for example, are forbidden from entering most Arab ports. Cypriot vessels
are barred from Turkish ports. Albanian, Cuban, Iranian, Kampuche'an, North Korean,
Libyan, Nicaraguan, and Syrian vessels are barred from United States ports. South African vessels are barred from the ports of many states. See id. at 6.
4. Flags of convenience, however, should not be confused with "flags according to
convenience." These are two distinct concepts. Flag of convenience refers to a method of
ship registration, whereas flag according to convenience refers to the illegal procedure in
which a shipowner registers a ship in more than one country and chooses to fly a particular flag for such reasons as evading jurisdiction. See United States v. Ayarza-Garcia,
819 F.2d 1043, 1046 (11th Cir.) (United States has jurisdiction if the ship "sails under
the authority of two or more states, and uses them according to convenience"), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 969 (1987). Unlike flags of convenience, flying a flag according to
convenience is strictly prohibited by article 2 of the Third United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122
[hereinafter UNCLOS], reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), which provides that offending ships are rendered stateless. The prohibition against multiple flags, however,
does not apply to displays of the flag to show some interest in the vessel. See B. BOCZEK,
FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 109 & n.66 (1962). For example, a Panamanian registered
vessel owned by United States nationals may fly the United States flag at the masthead
as long as the Panamanian flag flies aft. Id. This placement of flags indicates both
United States ownership and Panamanian registry. See id.
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foreign owned and foreign controlled vessels under conditions which, for
whatever the reasons, are convenient and opportune for the persons who
are registering the vessels." 5 Flags of convenience have been described as
"flags of necessity" insofar as shipQwners must re-register in open registries to accrue the benefits that permit their ships to remain competitive. 6
They also have been called "runaway flags" in the sense that the shipowners have "run away" from the flag under which they normally
would register their ships.7
The principal flag of convenience states are Liberia and Panama. 8
Other states, however, serve or have served as flag of convenience states.
These states include Costa Rica, Cyprus, Haiti, Honduras, Lebanon,
Malta, Morocco, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, and
Vanuatu.' This Note will discuss and analyze the requirements for registration that some flag of convenience states impose.' 0
Flags of convenience are controversial for many reasons. They received negative media coverage in the 1970s after a series of oil tanker
accidents involving flag of convenience vessels. Critics and courts blamed
these accidents on substandard ships and poorly trained crews." Adding
to the controversy, national governments and §hipowners expressed hostility on the grounds that low registration and operation costs available
in these open registry states posed an economic threat to the shipping
industry in traditional maritime states. 2 Labor unions still condemn
open registries for the job losses suffered in traditional maritime states
when shipowners hire foreign crews at considerably lower wage rates
13
after registering under flags of convenience.
This Note focuses on two dimensions of flags of convenience or open

B. BOCZEK, supra note 4, at 2.
6. Id. at 5-6.
7. Id. at 6.
8, See H. DEGENHARDT, MARITIME AFFAIRS 32 (1985).
9. See Comment, Vessel Registration in Selected Open Registries, 6 MAR.
5.

LAW. 221,

227 (1981).
10. See infra Part IV.B.2.
11. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, for
example, held that the Argo Merchant, a Liberian tanker that broke apart and spilled oil
off Nantucket in 1976, was unseaworthy, had poorly maintained navigational equipment,
and had officers who made negligent navigational errors. In re Complaint of Thebes
Shipping, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois also found similar circumstances surrounding the Amoco
Cadiz disaster in which a Liberian tanker ran aground off France and caused oil damage
to the French coastline. The "Amoco Cadiz," 2 Lloyd's Rep. 304 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
12. See B. METAXAS, supra note 1, at 57.
13. See infra Part VI.B.
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ship registration. First, this Note examines ship nationality and the
"genuine link" concept that opponents of flags of convenience promote to
limit or control flags of convenience. The promoters of this concept, including scholars and representatives of closed registry states, insist that
there be a genuine link between a ship and the state of registry for the
nationality to be valid. This Note questions the validity of the genuine
link concept and analyzes its effectiveness in eliminating flags of convenience. Second, the analysis of nationality leads into a discussion of ship
registration, the method by which states ascribe nationality. This discussion focuses on open registries and flags of convenience. The Note concludes by weighing the advantages and disadvantages of flags of convenience and determines whether they really deserve their tainted
reputation.
II.

A.

SHIP NATIONALITY

The Significance of Ship Nationality

It is a fundamental premise of customary international law that all
ships must have a nationality, 4 though some commentators condemn the
use of the term nationality to describe the legal relationship between ship
and state. 5 Critics of flag of convenience states view the nationality
granted by these states as illegitimate. This criticism of nationality is a
principal method opponents employ in their attempts to curtail open registries. Without requirements of ship nationality, however, the legal

14. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 91(1) ("Every state shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships.").
15. Some scholars disfavor the use of the term "nationality" on the grounds that
nationality's "special meaning with regard to the relationship between a State and a
person precludes its application to vessels." R. RIENOW, THE TEST OF THE NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL 8 (1937). For individuals, nationality indicates that the
individual is entitled to diplomatic protection from the state offering nationality. See B.
BOCZEK, supra note 4, at 117-18. For vessels, national character is dispositive in determining which law applies on board the vessel. Id. at 118-19. Thus, the term "nationality" may be inaccurate because national character rather than nationality is involved.
Some committee members at the International Law Commission (ILO) also expressed
disfavor with the term "nationality of ships." For example:
The representative of France (Mr. Pinto) criticized the expression "nationality of
ships" used in Article 29 of the Commission's draft. He pointed out that the legislation of at least thirty-seven countries did not use the concept of nationality to
define the legal status of ship. If the word "nationality" was retained, he said,
there was danger of losing sight of the fact that "pseudo-nationality" was involved.
M.

CHAUDHRI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS

154 (1988).
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system by which nations regulate conduct on the high seas would not
function. 16
A designated flag state is necessary for several reasons. First, on the
high seas, ships generally are subject only to the flag state's laws and to
international law. i1 Nationality is essential because it determines which
state exercises jurisdiction over the vessel"8 and which state's law governs
the ship's on-board activities.'" The 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides that "ships shall sail under the
flag of one state only and ... shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction
on the high seas." 20 Under some circumstances, ships may fly the flag of
an international organization and not be affiliated with a specific state. 2
Such organizations include the United Nations, United Nations agencies,
22
and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Certain authorities view vessels metaphorically as a floating piece of
the flag state's territory. 3 In legal terms, this indicates that on the high
seas the flag state may assert territorial jurisdiction over the activities
and persons on board. 24 United States and British courts embrace this
notion of the vessel as floating territory. 2 The Permanent Court of In-

16. "The lack of nationality, which might better be termed 'statelessness,' robs a ship
of privileges, and deprives it of a State to espouse its cause when it suffers injustice at the
hands of another State. Even the privilege of clearing port may be denied the stateless
vessel." R. RIENOW, supra note 15, at 14.
17.

See M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 272

(5th ed. 1984).
18. See R. CHURCHILL .& A. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 20 (2d ed. 1988).
19. "The law of the flag governs all occurrences on board." C. COLOMBOS, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 297 (6th ed. 1967).

20. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 92(1).
21. See G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 415 (5th ed. 1986). One unusual
example occurred in 1983, when the United Nations, for "strictly humanitariarr reasons," permitted ships evacuating Yasar Arafat and four thousand Palestine Liberation
Organization guerillas to fly the United Nations flag alongside the flag of registry. Id.
22. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 93. Article 93 provides that "[tihe preceding articles [which concern nationality and status of ships] do not prejudice the question of ships
employed on the official service of the United Nations, its specialized agencies or the
International Atomic Energy Agency, flying the flag of the organization." Id.
23.

See 1 J. MOORE, A DIGEST

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

930 (1906).

24. Id.
25. United States courts clearly have adopted this principle. See, e.g., Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Steam Vessel,
833 F.2d 1059, 1066 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[A] vessel on the high seas is under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the nation under whose flag she sails." (citation omitted)); United States v.
Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 264 (1893) ("It is natural to consider the vessels of a nation as
parts of its territory, though at sea, as the State retains jurisdiction over them; and,
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ternational Justice (PCIJ) also has supported this position.2 6 Some
scholars, however, reject this idea and argue that jurisdiction is based on
the nationality theory of jurisdiction rather than on territoriality.27
The notion of the ship as a territorial entity was recognized judicially
by the United States Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Sociedad Na28 In McCulloch, a Honduran corpocional de Marineros de Honduras.
ration sought to enjoin the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
from conducting an election for collective bargaining representation on
board a Honduran ship. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
decision enjoining the NLRB from interfering with the on-board activities of a foreign-registered vessel. The Court based its reasoning in part
on "the well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag
state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship."2 9

according to the commonly received custom, this jurisdiction is preserved over the vessels
even in parts of the sea subject to a foreign dominion." (quoting letter from Secretary of
State Webster to the British Foreign Minister, Lord Ashburton)); cf. Scharrenberg v.
Dollar Steamship Co., 245 U.S. 122, 127 (1917) ("It is, of course, true that for purposes
of jurisdiction a ship, even on the high seas, is often said to be a part of the territory of
the nation whose flag it flies. But in the physical sense this expression is obviously figurative, and to expand the doctrine to the extent of treating seamen employed on such a
ship as working in the country of its registry is quite impossible." (citation omitted)).
For a discussion of British court decisions regarding the principle that vessels are floating territory, see C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 312 (3d ed. 1948).
26. In the S.S. Lotus Case, (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, France
objected on jurisdictional grounds to the criminal negligence proceedings brought against
a French naval officer whose vessel collided with a Turkish vessel on the high seas. Eight
Turkish nationals drowned as a result of the collision. Id. at 10-11. The PCIJ ruled that
Turkey lawfully could assert jurisdiction:
It follows that what occurs on board a vessel on high seas must be regarded as if it
occurred on the territory of the State whose flag the ship flies. If, therefore, a
guilty act committed on the high seas produces its effects on a vessel flying another
flag or in foreign territory, the same principles must be applied as if the territories
of two different States were concerned, and the conclusion must therefore be
drawn that there is no rule of international law prohibiting the State to which the
ship on which the effects of the offence have taken place belongs, from regarding
the offence as having been committed in its territory and prosecuting, accordingly,
the delinquent.
Id. at 25.
27. The nationality principle of jurisdiction provides that states have jurisdiction over
their nationals even in the case of extraterritorial acts or renunciation of nationality because the national owes allegiance to his own country. See generally I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (3d ed. 1979); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS

28.
29.

238 (5th ed. 1955).

372 U.S. 10 (1963).
Id. at 21. This rule was established by the United States Supreme Court in Mali
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1. Competing State Interests
The McCulloch Court also suggested that the flag state's jurisdiction
extends to official inquiries into accidents involving ships registered
under its flag. In the Torrey Canyon oil tanker disaster,3 0 for example,
the flag state of the Torrey Canyon, Liberia, conducted an inquiry to
determine the accident's cause, even though the grounding occurred in
the British contiguous zone.3 The jurisdiction of the flag state is not
exclusive, however. When a nongovernment merchant vessel enters a foreign port, for example, the foreign state may impose its laws and jurisdiction on the vessel. 2 States eventually developed the practice whereby
the vessel will not be subject to the foreign state's jurisdiction in matters
concerning on-board discipline or economy. Acts concerning only the vessel or the persons on board that do not affect the "peace or dignity of the
country, or the tranquility of the port" 3 are left to the jurisdiction of the
v. Keeper of the Common Jail (Wildenhus's Case), 120 U.S. 1, 11 (1887). In
Wildenhus's Case, a Belgian sailor, aboard a Belgian-registered ship, stabbed to death a
fellow Belgian crew member below deck while the vessel was moored in Jersey City,
New Jersey. The Court held that Belgian law governed. Id. at 17.
30. For a detailed discussion of the Torrey Canyon disaster and its aftermath, see E.
COWAN, OIL AND WATER: THE

Torrey Canyon

DISASTER

(1968).

31.

See Report of the Board of Investigation in the Matter of the Stranding of the
S.S. Torrey Canyon on March 18, 1967, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 480 (1967) [hereinafter
Torrey Canyon Stranding Report].

32.

See Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. at 19; see also The Ester, 190 F. 216, 220

(D.S.C. 1911) (holding that "[t]he merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of
another for the purposes of trade subject themselves to the laws which govern the port
they visit, so long as they remain"); Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123
(1923) (holding that "[ilt
now is settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere
that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes ... the ports, harbors, bays and other
enclosed arms of the sea along its coast"); Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama Steamship Co., 362 U.S. 365, 372 (holding that "a ship that voluntarily enters the territorial
limits of this country subjects itself to our laws and jurisdiction as they exist"), reh'g

denied, 363 U.S. 809 (1960).
33. In Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. at 12, Chief Justice Waite reached his decision,
in part, on what he considered were substantial effects on commerce:
From experience ... it was found long ago that it would be beneficial to commerce
if the local government would abstain from interfering with general regulation of
the rights and duties of the officers and crew towards the vessel or among themselves. And so by comity it came to be generally understood among civilized nations that all matters of discipline and all things done on board, which affected
only the vessel or those belonging to her, and did not involve the peace or dignity
of the country, or the tranquility of the port, should be left by the local government to be dealt with by the authorities of the nation to which the vessel belonged
as the laws of that nation or the interests of its commerce should require.

19911
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flag state. Thus, jurisdiction over foreign vessels in United States ports is
discretionary rather than mandatory. 34 This practice, however, is not a
binding principle of international law. Rather, it is a practice states developed out of convenience and public policy concerns. 5
In the case of flag of convenience vessels, it may be necessary to consider other factors when determining jurisdiction because of the competing interests of the flag of convenience state and the shipowner's state.
United States courts, however, hold otherwise and apply the same standards to flag of convenience vessels and vessels of closed registry states. It
is well settled in United States courts that "the law of the flag, regardless
of ownership, governs the internal economy of the foreign vessel

....

,31

Thus, the on-board activities of a flag of convenience vessel, even when
in a port of the state of which the vessel's owner is a national, will be
subject to the flag of registry's laws as long as the peace and tranquility
of the port remains undisturbed.3
2.

Consequences of Statelessness

Ship nationality helps to maintain an orderly system of identification
and advocacy for ships on the high seas. The main consequence for a
ship without a nationality is that it lacks the protection that flag states
offer and, therefore, is not connected with a legal entity to advance or
cover its interests within the international legal system. 38 It is well established in international law that only states may bring actions 'against
other states. Further, stateless vessels are subject to seizure, largely be34. See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 142 (1957) ("It is
beyond question that a ship voluntarily entering the territorial limits of another country

subjects itself to the laws and jurisdiction of that country. The exercise of that jurisdiction is not mandatory but discretionary." (citation omitted)).
35. See B. BOCZEK, supra note 4, at 160.
36. Id. at 172-73.

37. Under some circumstances, the United States extends its maritime regulatory jurisdiction to foreign-registered ships if the ships have significant contacts with the United

States. In Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, reh'g denied, 400 U.S. 856
(1970), the United States Supreme Court held that the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. §§ 2103-

04) applied to a ship that was Greek-owned and Greek-registered. The Court found it to
be dispositive that the ship had significant contacts with the United States because (1) the

vessel regularly carried cargo between the United States and other nations and (2) the
ship's owner, who was not a United States citizen, managed the corporation from the

State of New York. Id. at 310.
38. "In the interest of order on the open sea, a vessel not sailing under the maritime
flag of any state enjoys no protection whatever, for the freedom of navigation on the open

sea is freedom for such vessels only as sail under the flag of a state."
INTERNATIONAL LAw 369-70 (8th ed. 1955).

L. OPPENHEIM,
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cause they have no protector state to protest such a seizure. Ships that
encounter stateless vessels are able to assert substantial liberties with
such ships because the ability to identify vessels is so essential to maintain order upon the high seas that seized ships engender little sympathy
in the transnational arena. 39
Although no international convention grants states the power to seize
a stateless vessel, UNCLOS article 110 provides that warships have a
right to search any stateless vessels they encounter.4 ° United States statutory4 ' and case law 42 take a similar view of stateless ships, deeming, ipso

facto, that they are subject to United States jurisdiction.
In Naim-Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine,43 the British
Privy Council held that a ship which lacks documentation to prove its
nationality could not claim that its seizure was a violation of international law." In one sense, however, the purported legal right of seizure
is illegitimate. Without fear of reproach, Britain was able to -establish a
self-serving seizure rule in Naim-Molvan, not because unfettered seizure
of stateless vessels is a fundamental premise of international law, but
because no state has standing to object. A state cannot act in international legal circles on behalf of a party that is not of that state's nationality."5 Thus, the right of seizure is by administrative fiat of the capturing
state. Because a stateless vessel is not connected with a state to object on
its behalf in an international forum, seizing states can act without fear of

39. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 108485 (1962).
40. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. l10(I)(d) ("Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship which encounters on the high seas a
foreign ship . . . is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for
suspecting that ... the ship is without nationality ....
).
41. "[A] vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States includes-(A) a vessel
without nationality; (B) a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nationality, in accordance
with paragraph (2) of article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas." 46 U.S.C.
app. § 1903(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1988).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 685 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1114 (1983) (All states
may assert jurisdiction over the ship when there are no legal links between the ship and
a state.). United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1979) (The United States has
the power to board and search a stateless vessel.).
43. [1948] App. Cas. 351 (P.C.).
44. Id. at 371. The Asya sailed from France destined for what is now Israel with
illegal immigrants as passengers. When a British destroyer approached the vessel on the
high seas, the Asya, without authority, raised first the Turkish and then the Zionist flag.
The court ruled against the owners of the Asya and held that stateless vessels were not
protected by the doctrine of the freedom of the open seas. Id.
45. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 18, at 172.
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interference or even criticism.
B.

Ship Registration

46
A state ascribes nationality to a vessel through ship registration.
States use three principal systems to register their ships: nationalist,
open, and balanced.4" States using the nationalist system do not permit
citizens of other states to sail under their flag. Many nationalist system
states also require that the ship be manufactured in their country. 48 The
principal nationalist, or closed, registries are Greece, Japan, Norway,
the Soviet Union, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.49
The second system is open registration, also known as flags of convenience,50 which is the antithesis of the nationalist system. Open registry
states allow the registration of ships owned by foreign citizens." In the
past, these states would register almost any ship upon payment of registration fees.52
The third system is the balanced system, which draws its characteristics from both nationalist and open registration systems. These also are
called quasi-flags of convenience, because they offer the advantages of
flag of convenience registries but have stringent national or genuine link
requirements.5" Some nationalist registry states in recent years have developed these alternatives to open registries for the purpose of retaining
ships within the nationalist registry. Norway and Denmark, for example, each have established international registers that permit foreign
crews, but both require that their nationals own the vessels.54 Similarly,
Spain has considered plans to turn the Canary Islands into an offshore
registry in an effort to prevent Spanish ships from reflagging under flags

46.

See M.

AKEHURST,

supra note 17, at 272. "It is the act of registering a ship

which results in its being granted a particular flag." Sinan, UNCTAD and Flags of
Convenience, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 95, 96 (1984).
47. See Sinan, supra note 46, at 97.
48.

Id.

49. See Comment, supra note 9, at 221 n.3.
50. In 1981, the United Nations adopted the phrase "open registry" to replace the
term "flag of convenience." Id.
51. See infra Part IV.A. One author argues that there is still no generally accepted

definition of "flags of convenience." See Osieke, Flags of Convenience Vessels: Recent
Developments, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 604, 604 n.1 (1979).
52. See M. AKEHURST, supra note 17, at 272.
53. See Bergstrand & Doganis, The Impact of Flags of Convenience (Open Registries), in THE LAw OF THE SEA AND INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING: ANGLO-SOvIET POST
UNCLOS

PERSPECTIVES

413 (W. Butler ed. 1985). For a discussion of genuine link

requirements, see infra Part III.B.
54. See LLOYD'S SHIP MANAGER, supra note 3, at 12, 18.
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of convenience.5 5
The alternative to systems of ascribing nationality to vessels is a potentially chaotic situation in which ships sail the seas without a state to
advance their interests or assert control over on-board activities. Ships
would be without protection from actions by other states, and these ships
could be the victims of piratical activities undertaken either independently or under the direction of a state without fear of legal reproach.
Similarly, stateless ships, without a direct authority to control them,
could degenerate into rogue vessels that serve as vehicles for nefarious
activities, such as smuggling, piracy, and drug-running.
In theory, the concept of ship registration as a system for mandating
order works: states control the ships and shipowners under their registries, and the shipping industry therein benefits. In practice, however,
the effectiveness of ship registration in combating the ills that nations
seek to avoid by ascribing nationality is limited by the central weakness
of international law: international law is consensual and binding only on
those states that choose to be bound. It takes just one state to circumvent
stringent regulations by fostering a haven for loose regulation. In the
absence of registration, states could assert control over ships indirectly by
asserting nationality jurisdiction over owners who are nationals. Yet this,
too, could be circumvented by transferring ownership and creating shell
corporations. Despite these shortcomings, however, ship registration is
more appealing than the chaos that would exist in its absence.
III.

THE LEGITIMACY OF FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE IN THE
CONTEXT OF SHIP NATIONALITY REQUIREMENTS

Some industrial states and many lesser developed countries (LDCs)
have joined together in an attempt to abolish open ,registries and stop the
flood of shipowners transferring their ships' registration to flag of convenience states. 6 Maritime industrial states have expressed resentment of
open registries on the grounds that they lure ships away from the home
registry, eliminate jobs for the home state's sailors, and otherwise

55. See Barnard, Spain, FinlandJoining Rush to Form Flags of Convenience, J.
Commerce & Commercial, Nov. 18, 1986, at 1, col. 2. "The proposed Canary Islands
registry is part of a package designed to help Spanish shipowners, who have accumulated
debts of about S1.5 billion. Eighty companies are likely to move their operations to the
Canaries, bringing about 360 of the country's 580 ships, according to the Spanish Maritime Institute." Id.

56. See, e.g., Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, Feb. 7, 1986, U.N.
Doc. TD/RS/CoNF/23 [hereinafter Ship Registration Convention], reprinted in 7 L.
SEA BULL. 87 (Apr. 1986).
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weaken the home state's shipping industry. 7 LDCs resent flags of convenience for similar reasons"8 and for the related reason that open registries, with cheap labor and reduced operating costs, undermine the development and competitiveness of LDC fleets."9
The legitimacy of open registries is unsettled under international law.
Part of the problem is that there is no effective international convention
on registration and granting nationality to vessels."0 Thus, states are left
to themselves, without the opportunity to consult internationally agreedupon standards, to delineate their own provisions concerning the granting of nationality to ships. 61 One vein of authority adamantly supports
the proposition that each state has the sovereign right to determine which
vessels may fly that state's flag. There is contrary authority, however,
suggesting that states do not have the right to grant nationality to a vessel absent a genuine link between the vessel and the state. This Note will
address these arguments in turn.
A. Judicial Recognition of Nationality Ascription

Although ascribing nationality to ships did not develop fully until the
end of the eighteenth century,6 2 the authority in favor of flags of convenience draws upon the well-establisthed principle of customary international law that one state cannot infringe upon the sovereign rights of
another state.6 3 The traditional rule of international law is that each
state is free to set the standards under which it will grant ships national57. See B.
58. See C.

METAXAS,

supra note 1, at 52, 57. See generally infra Part VI.B.

MAHALU, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SHIPPING PRACTICES:
EAST AFRICAN ASPIRATIONS 20 (1984).

59. Id. at 19-21. "The development and competitiveness of LDCs['] national fleets is
being adversely affected by flags of convenient [sic] fleets." Id. at 21.
60. See B. METAXAS, supra note 1, at 68.
61. Id. In fact, in some flag of convenience states, the legal provisions are completely

inadequate in form, methods of enforcement, or both. Some states simply do not have the
requisite administrative mechanisms to impose and enforce regulations. Id. Somalia, for

example, has minimal regulations concerning officers and crew: "Any person may be
engaged as Captain, Officer or member of crew provided he has the experience and

aptitude to fulfill those tasks designated to.him." Id. at 68-69.
62. See B. BOCZEK, supra note 4, at 94. Before the end of the eighteenth century,

states viewed vessels as belonging to citizens of a state rather than to the state itself.
This state of things led to great arbitrariness on the part of the stronger powers, in

particular in connection with neutrality in naval warfare. The question, decided
by each state according to its needs, was, what criteria should be applied in recognizing or not recognizing the flag under which the given ship was sailing.

Id.
63. See id.
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ity and register vessels.64 Even a landlocked nation has the right to
ascribe its nationality to vessels.6 5
The rule that allows states to set their own requirements for nationality developed over the course of the nineteenth century.66 This rule, however, first received major judicial recognition in the Muscat Dhows case
in 1905.67 In the Muscat Dhows case, subjects of the Sultan of Muscat
flew the French flag to evade Muscat's regulations and inspections68 and,
it was suggested, to participate in the slave trade.6 9 Britain, which controlled Muscat at the time, contended that the dhows,7" because they
were owned by citizens of Muscat, must fly Britain's flag rather than
France's flag. The Hague, however, rejected Britain's contentions that
ownership determined which flag a ship must fly. Rather, the Court held
that each sovereign state has the right to determine who has the right to
fly its flag "and to prescribe the rules giving such grants."'" Today, the
Muscat Dhows case is still the leading international authority for the
proposition that each state, as a matter of international law, determines
72
when and under what conditions it will grant nationality to vessels.
Lauritzen v. Larsen73 is the seminal United States case recognizing
the principle that each sovereign state has the right to delineate the conditions for granting a ship nationality.7 4 In Lauritzen, a Danish sailor
brought an action under the Jones Act against the Danish owner of a
Danish vessel. 75 The United States Supreme Court barred the seaman's
claim on the ground that Danish law (the law of the flag state), rather
than United States law, applied. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, held that "[e]ach state under international law may determine for
itself the conditions on which it will grant its nationality to a merchant

64. See D. BOWETT,

THE LAW OF THE SEA 55

(1967).

65. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 90.
66. See B. BOCZEK, supra note 4, at 94-97.
67. The Muscat Dhows (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 93 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1916).
68. Id.
69. See B. BOCZEK, supra note 4, at 100.
70, Dhows are 150 to 200 ton arab-style sailing vessels used primarily for trade

routes in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean.
SHIPS

71.

THE OXFORD COMPANION TO

245 (P. Kemp ed. 1976).
Muscat Dhows, 1916 Hague Ct. Rep. at 96.

& THE

SEA

72. See generally id.
73, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
74, See De Sieno, Choice of Law in Maritime Torts: An Analysis of a Recent Trend,
20 J. MAR. L. & COM. 375, 380 (1989).
75, Id. The Jones Act, codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 2103-04 (1988), provides that a
seaman injured as a result of his employer's negligence may recover from the employer.
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ship, thereby accepting responsibility for it and acquiring authority over
it. 117 Justice Jackson held further that the right to ascribe nationality to
vessels is absolute and only the state ascribing nationality legitimately
may question the nationality's validity."

Both Lauritzen and Muscat Dhows are compelling precedent for the
notion that each state shall determine whether it will ascribe nationality
to a ship. Furthermore, it follows from these cases that a state can
neither regulate another state's standards for ascribing nationality nor
forbid the existence of open registries.7 8 It is a basic principle of international law that each state is sovereign and should be free to conduct its
79
domestic affairs without interference from other states.
B.

The Genuine Link Requirement

Even if nations have the right to confer nationality on ships, the
ascription of nationality is meaningless unless other nations recognize the
ascribed nationality. There have been several attempts to use the "genuine link" requirement to restrict open registration and even to abolish
open registries. The genuine link concept traces back to the holding of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nottebohm case. 80 In

76. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 584.
77. Id. The proposition that only the flag state may question a registry's validity on
the high seas dates back to the 1873 case of the Virginius. The Virginius, a United
States registered ship flying the United States flag, was overtaken by a Spanish warship
on the high seas. The United States Department of State and the United States Attorney
General objected that even though the ship was flying the United States flag fraudulently, the Spanish government had no right to question the ship's registry on the high
seas, but could question the ship's registry only after the vessel had entered Cuban territorial waters. See 2 J. MOORE, supra note 23, at 895-903.
78. See supra notes 72 and 77 and accompanying text.
79. States desirous of preventing their nationals from reflagging under open registries
always can assert nationality jurisdiction over shipowners and forbid them from registering under a flag of convenience. The nationality principle of jurisdiction provides that a
state may assert jurisdiction over its nationals, even when the national acts outside the
boundaries of the nation. See D. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAw 386-87 (2d ed. 1976).
Thus, one avenue of control over flag of convenience vessels would be to assert control
over the shipowner rather than directly over the vessel. Yet, states are reluctant to advocate too strongly the elimination of flags of convenience, because they fear that ships
owned by their nationals would be less likely to be competitive economically with other
states' shipping. See infra Part V.A.
80. (Liecht. v. Guat.) 1955 I.C.J. 4. In the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
individuals do not have standing to bring actions on their own behalf. Rather, only states
have standing to bring claims in the court, the theory being that the injury is not suffered
by the individual, but by the states. See generally W. GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL
STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL TRIBU-
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Nottebohm, the government of Liechtenstein sought to bring a claim in
the ICJ against Guatemala on behalf of a naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein.81 The question arose whether Liechtenstein properly could act
on Nottebohm's behalf.82 Nottebohm had renounced his German citizenship and acquired Liechtenstinian citizenship to avoid the difficulties
German citizens encountered in Allied nations during World War 11.83
Because Guatemala viewed Nottebohm as a German citizen and an enemy alien, Guatemala seized his property and business.84 The ICJ effectively dismissed the central issues in the case by denying Liechtenstein
standing to litigate on Nottebohm's behalf because no "genuine link"
existed between Liechtenstein and Nottebohm.85 Specifically, the Court
was swayed by the tenuousness of Nottebohm's ties to Liechtenstein.
Nottebohm did not live in Liechtenstein; he did not maintain a residence
there, and he had maintained his family ties and business connections
with Germany.8"
1. International Law Commission Efforts
Since the 1950s, opponents of flags of convenience have applied the
Nottebohm case by analogy and have attempted to employ the genuine
link concept to combat open registries. 87 The eighth session of the International Law Commission (ILC) was the first formal discussion of the
application of the genuine link requirement to ship registration.88 The
ILC advanced the notion that questioning the links between states and
ships was analogous to questioning the links between states and people.8"
Though the Nottebohm case was not mentioned specifically at the ILC
session, it was most likely the catalyst behind the ILC's suggestion that

NALS

(1966).

81. Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 4.
82. "[Tjhe real issue before the court is the admissibility of the claim of Liechtenstein in respect of Nottebohm." Id. at 16.
83. Id. at 17.
84. Id. at 6-7, 18.
85. "Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a nationality granted in such
circumstances. Liechtenstein consequently is not entitled to extend its protection to Nottebohm vis-A-vis Guatemala and its claim must, for this reason, be held to be inadmissible." Id. at 26.
86. Id. at 25.
87. See, e.g., B. BOCZEK, supra note 4, at 116-17.
88. Id. at 119-20. See generally Regime of the High Seas, [1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N. 71, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/97/1956.
89. See B. BOCZEK, supra note 4, at 119.
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there be a genuine link between ships and their flag state. 0 To this end,
the ILC recommended to the conference that the convention provide that
"for purposes of recognition of the national character of a ship by other
states, there must exist a genuine link between the state and the ship."'"
Interestingly, neither UNCLOS nor the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
High Seas (High Sea§ Convention), 2 which was part of the predecessor
to UNCLOS, 9" denotes the consequences of a relationship that lacks a
genuine link between a vessel and a state. One commentator suggests
that, absent a genuine link, another state may judge the vessel stateless
and deny access to its ports.94 To date, however, no state has declined to
recognize the nationality of a vessel on the grounds that there was no
genuine link between the vessel and the state of registry.9"
Some opponents of the genuine link requirement for ships have argued
vociferously that the Nottebohm Case was not intended to include vessels.
At the eighth session of the ILC, both Guatemala and France argued
that the holding of Nottebohm did not apply to vessels. Both countries
contended that nationality applies only to individuals and that nationality, as applied to vessels, is only "pseudo nationality." 96 In addition, the
Nottebohm court limited its discussion to individuals, without mentioning
vessels and, in its analysis of the genuine link, focused on links that vessels lack. For instance, to determine that no genuine link existed between
Nottebohm and Liechtenstein, the ICJ considered that the individual's
"habitual residence," "the centre of his interests," the location of his
family and ancestors, and the "attachment shown by him for a given

90. See id. at 119-20. The genuine link requirement was "proposed by the government of the Netherlands, which in its comment on the provisional articles referred to the
Nottebohm judgment. This also is substantiated by the fact that the Nottebohm judgment
was mentioned in the 'Reference Guide to the Law of the Sea' adopted by the ILC ...

Id.
91. R. CARLISLE, supra note 2, at 155.
92. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962)
[hereinafter High Seas Convention].
93. The First Convention on the Law of the Sea (the First LOS Convention) was
comprised of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for
signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered
into force Sept. 10, 1964), the Convention on the High Seas, supra note 94, and the

Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force June 10, 1964).

94. G. VON

GLAHN,

supra note 21, at 414.

95. See id.
96. See B. BOCZEK, supra note 4, at 120-21.
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country and inculcated in his children.""7 Ships, as inanimate objects, do
not share any of these characteristics. Thus, applying Nottebohm to vessels arguably is illogical to the extent that courts would be required to
ascribe human characteristics to inanimate objects.
2.

The High Seas Convention and UNCLOS

The High Seas Convention was the "most significant" attempt to control flag of convenience vessels.9" The mechanism for control was the
insertion into the Convention of a genuine link requirement for nationality.9 9 This provision's goal was to control flags of convenience by limiting
a state's freedom to grant nationality to vessels. x00
The genuine link requirement, however, directly contravenes the principles espoused in Muscat Dhows and Lauritzen, both of which granted
states significant leeway to determine the conditions under which states
can register ships.' 0 ' Partly because of these contrary precedents, the
genuine link provision has been criticized severely.'0 2 Critics also have
condemned the genuine link provision for its ambiguity.' 0 3 The High
Seas Convention makes no further effort to define concisely the term
"genuine link." The ILC planned to formulate guidelines for inclusion
in the High Seas Convention, but eventually determined that such a definition would be impracticable.'1 4

97. Nottebohm Case (Liecht. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 22.
98. See Osieke, supra note 51, at 605-06.
99. High Seas Convention, supra note 92, art. 5.
Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the
nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a
genuine link between the state and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social
matters over ships flying its flag.
Id. (emphasis added).
100. See D. BowETT, supra note 64, at 56.
101. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
102. See D. BowETT, supra note 64, at 56; see also Dempsey & Helling, Oil Pollu-

tion by Ocean Vessels-An Environmental Tragedy: The Legal Regime of Flags of Convenience, Multilateral Conventions and Coastal States, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. 37, 59
(1980). See generally B. BOCZEK, supra note 4.
103.

See D. BowErr, supra note 64, at 56.

104. See McConnell, "Business as Usual": An Evaluation of the 1986 United Nations Convention on Conditionsfor Registration of Ships, 18 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 435
(1987). Additionally, the High Seas Convention is silent concerning the consequences or
status of a ship lacking a so-called genuine link. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra
note 18, at 206.
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The High Seas Convention's failure to define genuine link is a significant weakness in terms of enforcement and continuity, because flag states
are left to make their own determination of what constitutes a genuine
link. This lack of a definition has created a situation in which states will
find a genuine link depending upon their own particular economic needs
and interests. 0 5 The principal reason the High Seas Convention does
not define genuine link is that there is no generally agreed upon definition,1" 6 and therefore, "genuine link" has different meanings for different parties. 0 7 Flag of convenience states revel in the ambiguity surrounding the genuine link requirement because it conveniently leads to
economic benefits. 10 8
Similarly, UNCLOS did not resolve the genuine link controversy.' 0 9
UNCLOS Article 91 is virtually identical to the language of article 5 of
the High Seas Convention" and both documents fail to clarify what
constitutes a genuine link. This failure, however, arose from a lack of
consensus, rather than from a lack of interest or effort by the parties."'
This lack of consensus resulted, from disparate state interests and goals
that had become entrenched over the years during which no standard
definition was available." 2
3.

The Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships

In 1986, the United Nations Conference on Conditions for the Registration of Ships (Ship Registration Conference) attempted to define genuine link when it adopted the Convention on Conditions for Registration
of Ships (Ship Registration Convention)." 3 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) disseminated an optimistic
press release proclaiming that "[flor the first time an international in-

105. See McConnell, "... Darkening Confusion Mounted Upon Darkening Confusion: The Search for the Elusive Genuine Link, 16 J. MAR. L. & COM. 365 (1985).
106. See Dempsey & Helling, supra note 102, at 59.
107. See B. METAXAS, supra note 1, at 69.
108. See McConnell, supra note 104, at 436-37.
109.

UNCLOS provides that:

Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its Nationality to ships, for the
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the

nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a
genuine link between the State and the Ship.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 99(a) (emphasis added).
110. See High Seas Convention, supra note 92.
111. See McConnell, supra note 104, at 439.
112. Id.
113. See Ship Registration Convention, supra note 56.
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strument now exists which defines the elements of the 'genuine link' that
should exist between a ship and the State whose flag it flies." ' 14 The
Ship Registration Conference, however, has proven no more successful at
defining genuine link than previous attempts.1 15 The drafters included
the term "economic" in conjunction with "genuine link" to require states
to insist upon "key economic links" between the vessel and the flag
state. 11 6 The economic link, which is considered critical to establishing a
genuine link, is related additionally to the idea that only nationals of the
17
flag state be able to own, manage, and crew vessels under the flag.1
Until the end of the Ship Registration Conference, some states, most
notably the LDCs, required that a new definition of genuine link encompass national ownership, management, and staffing requirements." 8
Had the delegates incorporated this requirement in their final definition,
it is likely that the definition of genuine link would have been sufficiently
succinct so that future disagreement on the legitimacy of an ascribed nationality would have been minimal. Legitimacy of the ascribed nationality would have been less subject to question, because nationals of the flag
state would have been required to exert control over the aspects of the
ship that give the ship its identity: who owns it, who controls it, and who
works on it. Instead, prior to the final signing, the LDCs abandoned
their initial insistence on the national control requirements." 9 As a result, the definition of genuine link in the Ship Registration Convention
mandates that the flag state still must control management of the ship,
though the ship owner now may choose between meeting the requirements for either manning of the ship or ownership.' 2 The criteria for

114. UNCTAD Information Unit, U.N. Doc. No. TAD/INF/1770, Feb. 7, 1986,
reprinted in McConnell, supra note 104, at 435.
115. See generally McConnell, supra note 104, at 449. McConnell concludes that
"[tihe 1986 Convention on the Conditions for Registration of Ships fails to achieve its
stated objective. It appears to have come closer to truly identifying an enforceable 'genuine link' and, rather than phasing out open registry practice, its provisions appear to
have legitimized the practice." Id.
116. Id. at 444.
117. "The heart of the [Ship Registration] Convention, Articles 8, 9 and 10 provide
for participation by nationals of the flag State in the ownership, manning and management of ships, thus establishing key economic links between a ship and the flag State that
are often missing in practice." UNCTAD Information Unit, supra note 114, reprinted
in McConnell, supra note 104, at 444.
118. See McConnell, supra note 104, at 444.
119. See id. at 445.
120. "[A] state of registration has to comply with either the provisions of paragraphs
1 and 2 of article 8 [ownership] or with the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 3 of article 9
[manning], but may comply with both." Ship Registration Convention, supra note 56,

RE-EVALUATING FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE

1991]

what constitutes ownership, however, are ill-defined. First, the provision
is not clear as to whether there must be equity participation in ownership. Second, the term "owner" is defined simply as the person on record
who is registered as the owner of the vessel. 12' Finally, this section leaves
open the possibility that not all of the owners need be domiciled in the
same state.
In essence, the attempt to define genuine link in the Ship Registration
Convention fails in that shipowners and states still must work with an
ill-defined, yet crucial term. Although the intentions of the Ship Registration Conference were ambitious, any substantive effect is negated by
language that encourages self-interpretation rather than compliance with
a concise, universal standard. Rather than using affirmative commands
such as "shall" or "will," the framers invoked passive, nondeclaratory,
noncommand language such as "observe in principle" and "may" and
"satisfactory part. ' As a result, the definition of genuine link currently is no more workable or concise than it was before the Ship Registration Convention was adopted and when UNCLOS and the High Seas
Convention were the sole documents with which the parties had to work.
4.

Enforcement of the Genuine Link Requirement

Thus, the genuine link provisions in the High Seas Convention,
UNCLOS, and the Ship Registration Convention are too vague. To be
effective in limiting or controlling flags of convenience, the requirement
for genuine link must be defined in unequivocal language. Further, a
possible enforcement mechanism would be to ban ships from entering a
port if they fly a flag in violation of the genuine link requirement. Several authorities support this enforcement mechanism, 2 3 and in theory, it
would be possible to impose.

art. 7.

121. Id. art. 6.
122. See, e.g., id. art. 8, para. 2 ("... should be sufficient to permit the flag State to
exercise effectively its jurisdiction and control over ships flying its flag"); art. 7 (". . . a
state of registration has to comply with either the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of
article 8 [ownership] ori with the provision of paragraphs 1 to 3 of article 9 [manning],
but may comply with both"); and art. 9 ... observe in principle that a satisfactory part
of the complement").
123. Barring open registry vessels from entering ports as an enforcement mechanism
against open registries has been suggested by several authors. See, e.g., D. BowETT,
supra note 64, at 59; B. BOCZEK, supra note 4, at 204, 208, 290; Watts, The Protection
of Merchant Ships, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 52 (1957); McDougall, Burke, & Vlasic,
The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea and the Nationality of Ships, 54 Am. J. INT'L

L. 25, 29 (1960).
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In the past, the mere threat of banning ships with certain registry
from entering a port has proven effective. For example, before the December 1989 invasion of Panama by United States troops, President
Bush announced that after February 1, 1990, Panamanian registered
vessels would be banned from United States ports.'2 4 Although the ban
was retracted before it entered into effect, the interim result was that
25
shipowners rushed to reflag their vessels under other flags.'
To be an effective deterrent against flags of convenience, a ban would
have to apply to all flag of convenience states. Otherwise, shipowners
simply would re-register their vessels under other flags of convenience. A
ban would be desirable insofar as shipowners would be forced to abandon registries that do not comply with the banning state's criteria for
control over the vessel. On the other hand, banning a nation's vessels
from ports could inhibit trade. If some shipowners avoid trade with banning nations rather than sail complying ships, then ship terminals probably would experience diminished business and some LDC sailors on
banned ships likely would lose their jobs.
Because no closed registry states have employed a comprehensive ban
against flags of convenience, the existence of open registries has continued undeterred. Furthermore, in spite of their existence in various treaties, the genuine link requirements have had no effect on flags of convenience. Thus, contrary to assertions in the preamble to the High Seas
Convention,' 26 the genuine link requirement, as applied to nationality of
vessels, has not been accepted as customary international law.
IV.

RECOGNIZING CHARACTERISTICS OF FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE

A.

Typical Characteristics

The requirements for flags of convenience are much less stringent
than those of closed or nationalist registries and share characteristics and
standards for granting nationality that contrast sharply with the requirements in nationalist systems.' 27 There are six principal characteristics of
open registries that distinguish them from closed or balanced registries.
124. See Field Day for Lawyers, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 15, 1990, at 2, col. 1.
125. See id. President Bush's plan to ban Panamanian vessels from United States
ports resulted in the reflagging of approximately 400 vessels. "Lawyers advised shipowners to change their flags and helped lenders, who were drawn into the fracas because of
mortgages, issue new ones under new flags." Id.
126. High Seas Convention, supra note 92, preamble ("The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea ... adopted the following provisions as generally declaratory
of international law.").
127. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 18, at 206.
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First, the open registries allow noncitizens to own or control merchant
vessels. Second, registration is easy to accomplish, with many open registries allowing registration at a consul's office abroad. Third, income from
ships either is not taxed locally or the taxes are low. Also, the open
registration state may guarantee, or the owner may have an understanding with the state, that the ship will remain free from taxation in the
future. Usually, the only charges for a flag of convenience are registration fees and annual fees based on tonnage. Fourth, open registry states
are small countries that have no national shipping registration requirements, but receipts from very small charges on large tonnage may have a
substantial effect on national income and balance of payments. Fifth,
owners and managers are freely permitted to man their ships with nonnationals. Lastly, the country of registry cannot practically impose government or international regulations, and it has neither the wish nor the
power to control the companies themselves. 2 '
B.

Registration Requirements of Various States

The typical nationalist or closed registry forbids the types of activity
characteristic of flag of convenience states and imposes antithetical requirements. In contrast to nationalist registry requirements, open registry requirements are either minimal or easily circumvented. This Note
will analyze and compare the requirements that different states mandate.
1. Closed Registration States
a.

The United States

The requirements for United States registry are stringent. Since the
nineteenth century, the United States has stressed strong bonds between
the ship, the owners, and the United States.' 2" To be eligible for United
128.

See

COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO SHIPPING (ROCHDALE REPORTS) CMND.

No. 4337, reprinted in Bergstrand & Doganis, supra note 53, at 414. Although these
are traditional factors, the last two items (freely manning with non-nationals and the
inability or lack of desire to control ships and their companies) arguably are no longer in
line with current reality. See Dune, Registration of Vessels and Mortgages in Developing Open Registries in the Caribbean,in 2 CURRENT ISSUES IN SHIP FINANCING 1983

at 7, 9-10 (P.L.I. 1983).
129.

"Ships or vessels of the United States are the creations of the legislation of

Congress. None can be denominated such ... except those registered or enrolled according to the act of September 1, 1789 and those which, after the last day of March, 1793

shall be registered or enrolled in pursuance of the act of [Dec. 31, 1792, 1 Stat. 287], and
[such ships] must be wholly owned by [United States citizens]." White's Bank v. Smith,
74 U.S. 646, 655 (7 Wall) (1869).
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States registry, a vessel must: (1) employ primarily a United States
crew;"' 0 (2) employ only United States officers;' 3' (3) have its repairs
performed in the United States or face additional taxation;' 32 (4) be
wholly owned by United States citizens or a corporation under United
34
States law; 3 3 and (5) be under the control of a United States citizen.1
The ownership provisions, in particular, are strict.' 3 5 Only United
States citizens may own United States-registered vessels.' 36 United
States-organized partnerships may register a vessel under the United
States flag only if all the general partners are United States citizens and
only if the controlling interest is United States-owned. 3 ' Unlike open
registry nations, the United States does not facilitate corporation formation under the United States flag. Rather, a corporation's ability to register a vessel in the United States hinges upon the nationality of the directors, officers, and the corporation itself. To register a vessel: (1) the
corporation must be organized under United States law; (2) the president
or chief executive officer and its chairman of the board must be United
States citizens; and (3) the number of alien directors must be less than
the number necessary to constitute a quorum. 38

130. 46 U.S.C. § 8103(b) (1988). This section provides in pertinent part that on
board all United States registered ships unlicensed seamen must be citizens or permanent
resident aliens of the United States and that not more than 25% of the total of unlicensed
seaman may be permanent resident aliens. Id.
131. Id. § 8103(a). "Only a citizen of the United States may serve as master, chief
engineer, radio officer, or officer in charge of a deck watch or engineering watch on a
documented vessel." Id.
132. See 19 U.S.C. § 1466(a) (1988).
133. 46 U.S.C. § 12102(a) (1988).
Any vessel of at least 5 net tons not registered under the laws of a foreign country
is eligible for documentation if the vessel is owned by-(l) an individual who is a
citizen of the United States . . . (3) a partnership whose general partners are
citizens of the United States . . ., (4) a corporation established under the laws of
the United States ....

Id.
134. Id. § 12110(d). "A documented vessel may be placed under the command only
of a citizen of the United States." Id.
135. See generally Goodman & Saunders, Federal Regulation of Certain Foreign
Investment in the United States, 13 INT'L Bus. LAw. 7, 7 (1985).
136. Id.; see also 46 U.S.C. § 12102(b)(1).

137.

46 U.S.C. § 12102(a).

138. Id. § 12102(a)(4). Registration by a corporation of a vessel under the United
States flag will be permitted only if it is "a corporation established under the laws of the
United States or of a State, whose president or other chief executive officer and chairman
of its board of directors are citizens of the United States and no more of its directors are
noncitizens than a minority of the number necessary to constitute a quorum." Id.
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The United States, however, will permit vessels of foreign flags to
transfer to United States registry under special circumstances. To fly the
United States flag, ownership must be transferred to a United States
national or corporation and meet technical design and construction requirements.1 39 Even if the ship does not meet these requirements, the
President of the United States may waive the requirements if it would
benefit foreign commerce.140 The Secretary of Defense also may waive
the ownership requirement in the interest of national defense. 4 In
1987, then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger invoked this provision to permit eleven Kuwaiti tankers to reflag under the United States
flag. 42 This reflagging was criticized sharply by some members of Congress who complained that the United States was giving protection to
Kuwaiti ships that it would not give to United States-owned ships that
fly flags of convenience. 43
b.

The United Kingdom

Britain does not delineate as many restrictions for ascribing nationality to vessels as does the United States. The principal requirement is that
the shipowners be British subjects or corporations.' 44 This provision is
significant because "British subjects" is a broad category, including citi139. Id. § 12102(b).
140.

Id. § 3101. This section provides that "[w]hen the President decides that the

needs of foreign commerce require, the President may suspend a provision of this part for
a foreign built vessel registered as a vessel of the United States on conditions that the

President may specify." Id.
141.
142.

See Act of Dec. 27, 1950, ch. 1155, Pub. L. No. 891, 64 Stat. 1120 (1950).
See 133 CONG. REc. at 59495 (daily ed. July 9, 1987) (statement of Sen.

Sasser).
143. See id. at S9496. Senator Bumpers objected on the grounds that the United
States would receive no benefit from allowing the Kuwaiti tankers to reflag. "I can tell
you one thing: We get nothing out of it. We are going to be asking American servicemen
to die for Kuwait, who will not even let us land so much as a helicopter on their soil."
Id. at S11589 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
144.
A ship shall not be deemed to be a British ship unless owned wholly by persons
of the following description (in this Act referred to as persons qualified to be owners of British Ships); namely
(a) . . . British subjects(d) ... Bodies corporate established under and subject to the laws of some part
of Her Majesty's dominions, and having their principal place of business in those
dominions.
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, pt. 1, § 1, reprinted in 39 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 734 (4th ed. 1988).
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zens of all British colonies and commonwealth countries145 in addition to
citizens of Great Britain."46
To determine whether a corporation may register a ship under the
British flag, British law ignores the nationality of the shareholders and,
instead, considers the location of the principal place of business.147 This
view of ownership and nationality contrasts with the United States approach, which is concerned highly with the owner's nationality.' 4 8 Thus,
each attempt to register a ship under the British flag triggers a fact question as to the locality of the business. This question encompasses determining where the business operates and where the business is controlled. 4" The location of board meetings and directors, for example, is
strong evidence of whether the business is controlled locally. 5
2.

Open Registration States

a.

Liberia

It is no accident that Liberia's Code of Laws is favorable to easy registration. A group of United States shipowners and corporations led by
Edward Stettinius, former Secretary of State to Franklin D. Roosevelt,
established Liberia's open registry in 1947 with the express intention of
creating a registry with standards even lower than those of Panama.""'
Today, Liberia's laws concerning ship registration are significantly less
stringent than those of the United States or Britain, especially concerning ownership and manning provisions.' 52 Vessels larger than 1600 tons
may be registered only by Liberian citizens or nationals, but Liberia
considers corporations and partnerships to be nationals of Liberia.' 53 In
addition, this provision is circumvented easily by the flexibility of Libe-

145. Commonwealth countries may register under the British flag only if that country also considers its own citizens to be British subjects or Commonwealth citizens. See
Hamilton, England and Wales, in 3A HANDBOOK ON MARITIME LAw-A REGISTRATION OF VESSELS, MORTGAGES ON VESSELS 137, 138 (L. Hagberg ed. 1983).
146. Id.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
supra note 133 and accompanying text.
Hamilton, supra note 145, at 138.
id. at 138-39.
A. CAFRUNY, RULING THE WAVES 94-95 (1987). See infra notes 158-66

and accompanying text (discussing registration standards of Panama).

152. These standards are lower largely because Mr. Stettinius, Chase Manhattan
Bank, Esso, and Standard Oil of New Jersey framed Liberia's Code of Laws and established the International Trust Company in New York as the clearing house for registering vessels under the Liberian flag. See id.
153. 22 LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS § 51(g) (1981).
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rian incorporation law.15 4 The flexibility arises in that the ownership
requirements will be waived if cause is shown and if (1) the vessel meets
all registration requirements, (2) the need for the waiver is shown, and
(3) the owner establishes a maritime trust and either maintains an office
or appoints a local agent.' 55 Non-Liberian nationals may establish corporations easily upon payment of minimal application and registration
fees. 56 Liberia also provides shipowners with tax benefits by excluding
from gross income earnings made from shipping activities outside of
Liberia. 5
b.

Panama

Panama was one of the original flags of convenience.' 8 Since its emergence as a flag of convenience, Panama has developed into a major registry of vessels, along with Liberia.'5 9 Like the classic model of an open
registry state, 8 0 Panama permits foreign-owned ships to fly the Panamanian flag. Foreign individuals or corporations 6' residing in either
Panama or abroad may register vessels in Panama. 62 Although Panama
does have a requirement that ten percent of the crew be Panamanian
nationals, this requirement will be waived if a sufficient number of Pan-

154. For a cogent delineation of the requirements for incorporation and the contents
of the articles of incorporation, see Brumskine, Organizing Business Corporations in
Liberia, 8 LIBERIAN L.J. 2 (1986).
155. 22 LIBERIAN CODE oF LAWS § 51(f) (1981).
156. See Comment, supra note 9, at 230.
157. The Liberian Code provides that:
There shall be excluded from gross income all earnings derived from the operation, chartering or disposition of ships and aircraft. In the case of a ship or aircraft
documented under the laws of Liberia, this section shall not apply to the extent the
earnings are derived from traffic exclusively within Liberia.
36 LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS § 11.23 (1979).
158. The genesis of Panama's open registry dates back to the period following World
War I when a few United States shipowners quietly re-registered their vessels in Panama. The growth of the Panamanian registry increased rapidly in the 1930s and in the
years immediately following World War II. See R. CARLISLE, supra note 2, at 1-2.
159. See id.
160. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
161. "[T]he corporation law of Panama imposes no restrictions upon the ownership
of shares of a Panamanian Corporation by foreign citizens or corporations, nor are there
any nationality restrictions nor residence requirements imposed upon directors or officers
of Panamanian corporations under the said law." Arosemena, Formation, Operation
and Taxation of Corporationsunder the Laws of the Republic of Panama,in CURRENT
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL SHIP FINANCE 1984 at 209 (P.L.I. 1984).
162. See Comment, supra note 9, at 232.
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amanian citizens are not available at the port where the crew is hired..'"
Panama also does not require that officers be Panamanian citizens. 64 In
addition, taxation is minimal with an assessed rate of ten cents per ton
and an annual lump sum charge of not more than 1800 dollars per
year. 165 Access to the Panamanian registry is easy and may be done directly in Panama's shipping office in New York. 66
V.

ADVANTAGES

A.

OF FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE

Direct Economic Benefits

For shipowners, there arguably are several advantages for registering
their vessels under a flag of convenience. Consumers also accrue economic benefits from lower prices for consumer goods because of lower
shipping costs.167 Critics, however, scorn these advantages and claim
that, in the long run, the disadvantages to consumers outweigh the advantages.1 6 For many shipowners, however, the advantages of flags of
convenience exceed in value the disadvantages. Most of the advantages of
flags of convenience are direct pecuniary rewards. Other advantages have
political undertones; yet, they too result in at least indirect economic benefits.1 6" Not surprisingly, the primary benefits to shipowners mirror sev-

163. See id. at 234.
164. See id.
165. See id. For shipowners, there is no further taxation. Owners of vessels registered in Panama's open registry are not taxed on their profits from shipping operations
conducted outside of Panama. "The income tax of Panama is levied only upon 'Net
Income' derived from operations within the territory of the Republic of Panama. Income
derived from operations consummated abroad is not income obtained from 'sources
within Panama' and therefore is not taxable under law." Arosemena, supra note 161, at
218. Similarly, Panama taxes the wages of crew members aboard Panamanian registered
vessels only if such crew members are permanent residents of Panama. The salaries of
nonresidents are not taxed. Id. at 219.
166. See Comment, supra note 9, at 236.
167. "The ultimate beneficiaries of the open registries are the consumers who are the
ultimate users of the reasonable low cost and reliable shipping services which are provided." Dune, supra note 128, at 12.
168. B. METAXAS, supra note 1, at 100-02. Professor Metaxas argues that
if we take a global long run view of the matter, we cannot help but see that, even
on the basis of the criteria mentioned above, the expansion of [open registry shipping] has produced a net social disbenefit for the world community at large, rather
than marginal benefits in the form of lower freight rates.
Id. at 100.
169. "Shipowners may turn to open registry because of political instability at home,
the desire of lending institutions to achieve more protection for their mortgage liens,
desire to achieve political neutrality or anonymity, which the corporate laws of certain
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eral of the typical characteristics that distinguish open registries from
closed or balanced registries.1 70 According to a recent report of the International Labour Conference, shipowners register their ships under flags
of convenience principally because (1) income taxes on ship income are
non-existent or small; (2) there is little formality in registering a ship or
deleting it from registry, and beneficial ownership can remain confidential; (3) managers can hire foreign crews at lower costs, and managers
and owners seldom must meet nationality requirements; and (4) open
registry states have limited powers to enforce national or international
7
shipping regulations.
B.

Taxation

The tax benefits to a shipowner registering a vessel under a flag of
convenience are significant. First, open registry nations generally provide
that any income earned from operating vessels under their flag while
2 Second, a
engaged in international trade is not subject to taxation.Y1
United States shipowner can increase the economic benefits and avoid
payment of United States taxes if it forms a corporation in the open
73
registry nation to oversee the shipping operations.'
Section 883(a)(1) of the United States Internal Revenue Code provides
that gross income is exempt from taxation if it is "[g]ross income derived
by a corporation organized in a foreign country from the international
operation of a ship or ships if such foreign country grants an equivalent
exemption to corporations organized in the United States.' u 4 The
United States currently has reciprocal agreements with more than
twenty-one nations that exempt foreign shipping income from gross in-

open registries provide." Dune, supra note 128, at 12.
170. See supra notes 46-55, 127-28 and accompanying text.
171. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 1 ANN. REv.
LAW AND POLICY, MAIN DOCUMENTS,

OF OCEAN AFFAIRS:

1985-87, (74th Session) 196 (1989).

172. For example, "[t]he Republic of Vanuatu levies no income taxes of any kind on
either business or personal income .... ." Hubbard, Registration of A Vessel Under
Vanuatu Law, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 235, 241-42 (1982). The Bahamas "do not
impose any tax on income, capital gains or similar financial revenues. The operations
and income of ships registered in the Bahamas are completely free of tax whether the
ship is foreign owned or owned by a Bahamian company." LLOYD'S SHIP MANAGER,

supra note 3, at 7.
173. "In the case of earnings derived from vessels which never enter U.S. waters, no
direct U.S. tax is imposed on transportation services income (even if management or
administrative activities are performed within the United States)." Dune, supra note
128, at 98.
174. I.R.C. § 883(a)(1) (1991).
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come.' 75 Thus, this tax exemption is an incentive for United States shipowners to incorporate in a flag of convenience state, even if the state does
not require that one of its nationals, either a person or corporation, be an
76
owner.'
United States law requires that the corporation pay taxes on profits
distributed to shareholders.' 7 7 The foreign corporation, however, can defer its taxes by distributing dividends when the rates are more advantageous. 1' The corporation also has the opportunity to "use the tax-free
accumulation of foreign earnings for new investment or for maintenance
a7
of [its] existing fleet."'
C.

Operating Costs

There also are other economic considerations that shipowners find
favorable in flag of convenience registries. The primary benefit is derived
from lower operating costs, which are achieved by decreased labor costs,
lower repair costs, and the fact that foreign-registered vessels do not have
to meet United States safety standards.'8 There is a substantial disparity
between the operation of ships registered in open and nationalist registries in that operating a ship under the United States flag can cost as
much as seventy percent more than operating the same ship under a flag
of convenience." 8 '
Decreased labor costs of operating a flag of convenience vessel is the

175. See Wittig, Tanker Fleets and Flags of Convenience: Advantages, Problems,
and Dangers, 14 TEX. INT'L L.J. 115, 120-22 (1979).
176. Liberia, for example, does not require ownership by a national as a condition
for registry; yet many United States shipowners will incorporate a subsidiary in Liberia
to take advantage of the tax exemptions. See Dempsey & Helling, supra note 102, at 54.
In Panama, this is facilitated by extremely liberal laws of incorporation. See Wittig,
supra note 175, at 121. Panama's commercial code does not require incorporators, officers, or directors to be nationals or residents of Panama. See id.
It also authorizes the issuance of all kinds of shares, permits meetings to take place
outside of Panama, and does not require a director to be a shareholder. Liberian
laws are similarly unrestrictive, except that the Liberian Code of Laws of 1956
requires that a corporation have a place of business in Liberia and a qualified
business agent. If the foreign corporation has no operating office in Liberia, the
Liberian legislature may authorize a bank or trust company to act as resident
business agent.
Id.
177, See Dempsey & Helling, supra note 102, at 54.
178. See Wittig, supra note 175, at 121-22.
179. Id. at 122.
180. See infra Part VI.B.
181. See Dempsey & Helling, supra note 102, at 51.
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principal reason United States shipowners register their vessels in open
registry nations.182 By transferring to a flag of convenience and decreasing labor expenditures, shipowners can be more competitive with foreign
shippers.' 83 Crew costs alone can be responsible for half of the total operating costs.' 84 The International Shipping Federation reports that in
Britain, for example, labor costs of operating a ship under the British
flag are 908,000 dollars per year, while the labor costs to operate the
same ship under Hong Kong's flag with a Hong Kong crew is only
396,000 dollars per year.' 85 Greek shipowners also have shifted registry
to other nations' in search of lower labor costs."8 " Greek shipowners
can save an average of four hundred dollars per day by using Asian crew
members working for wages well below those required by Greek crew
members.' 88 Norwegian shipowners also have cited high labor costs as a
principal factor in decisions to reflag under a flag of convenience.'8
There are several reasons why labor costs for shipowners in industrialized nations are higher than in open registry states. United States and
European shipowners must contend with unions that have been successful in obtaining high wages and benefits for their crew members. Shipowners also must pay overtime, whereas owners of ships flying flags of
convenience generally pay sailors strictly on a salary basis. 9 In addition, on flag of convenience vessels, shipowners are not required to make
social security payments or pay a specified minimum wage.' 9 ' Because

182.
183.

See Bergstrand & Doganis, supra note 53, at 416-17.
See Wittig, supra note 175, at 119-20.

184. See M.

STOPFORD,

MARITIME ECONOMICS

103 (1988).

185. Non-National Manning Here to Stay, Origin Universal News Services Ltd.,
Feb. 5, 1987. (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file) (statement of John Whitworth, director of the International Shipping Federation). Similarly, a Liberian flag vessel with a
Korean crew results in labor costs of $490,000, and a Polish labor force would cost only
$338,000. Id.
186. Shipping in the Doldrums, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1987, at 44.
187. Greece used to be the second largest maritime nation in the world in terms of
tonnage. It now ranks fourth behind Liberia, Panama, and Japan. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Bergstrand & Doganis, supra note 53, at 417. Norway's desire to avoid the
denigrating effects of high labor costs also contributed to its decision to initiate a hybrid
registration system. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
190. "In addition to the difference in direct wages, regulations vary between individual countries and companies over the conditions of service, i.e. shift work, leave, overtime
and other fringe benefits received by the crews. Indirect wage costs include pensions,
social insurance, holidays, training, crew rotation and travel." M. STOPFORD, supra note
184, at 105.
191. See Payne, Flags of Convenience and Oil Pollution: A Threat to National
Security?, 3 Hous. J. INT'L L. 67, 71 (1980).
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the standards for crew members are lower on flag of convenience vessels,
shipowners can hire less experienced crews for less money. Thus, to
avoid these high costs of employment, shipowners flock to open registries
in part to seek non-union crews to bring down the operating costs and
make their operations competitive in international shipping markets.
Today, as a result of these labor cost disparities, vessels with United
States and European crews are among the costliest in the world to operate.' 92 Annual labor costs in 1977 dollars are 1.7 million dollars to crew
a thirty-two man, 50,000 ton United States tanker.' 93 In comparison, on
a similar ship, an all-Italian crew costs 600,000 dollars and an all-Spanish crew costs 450,000 dollars. 8
For United States ships to compete in the global shipping market,
United States shipowners must receive substantial subsidies from the
United States government. The Merchant Marine Act of 1935195 provides that the United States government will subsidize shipowners who
operate vessels engaged in foreign trade.' 6 The government extends the
subsidy, however, only to ships built in the United States. 9 ' The construction cost of the vessel in the United States is higher, which has the
effect of reducing the net amount of the subsidy to the shipowner.' 98
VI.

GROUNDS FOR OPPOSITION TO FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE

Shipowners incur immediate economic benefits by registering their
ships under flags of convenience. These benefits are not acclaimed universally, however. According to its critics, open registry shipping allegedly inflicts a variety of ills upon economies and the environment. Although some open registries may earn this condemnation, other registries
are not so offensive and deserve a more respected role in international
shipping.

192. For example, a 20,000 dead weight ton container ship with a European crew of
26 would cost $1.05 million per year in 1983 dollars, while a Korean or Taiwanese crew

of the same size would cost $580,000 per year. See J. JANSSON & D.
LINER SHIPPING ECONOMICS 16 (1987).

SHNEERSON,

193. See Recent Tanker Accidents: Legislationfor Improved Tanker Safety: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 79 (1977).
194. Id. at 33.
195. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1151-61 (1988).
196. Id.§ 1151.
197. Id.
198. See Wittig, supra note 175, at 120.
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Nefarious Activities

Although the primary reason shipowners register their vessels under
flags of convenience is to reduce operating costs, some shipowners seek
less legitimate advantages. For example, flag of convenience vessels have
been used to circumvent international attempts to protect whales.199 The
1946 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling200 sets out to protect
both the whale populations and the existing whale industry.2 0 1 Some
whaling vessel owners who seek to avoid controls imposed by this treaty
on their whaling operations have registered their vessels under flag of
convenience states, such as the Bahamas and Cyprus, which were not
signatories to the treaty. 202 In recent years, however, as international
campaigns against whaling have increased, the problem of "whaling
under flags of convenience has also lessened. ' ' 20 3 Thus, the problem of

shipowners seeking to evade international conventions on whale protection by seeking flag of convenience registry is less severe today.
Another use of flag of convenience vessels for evading international
regulations is pirate radio broadcasts, whereby individuals seek to avoid
international radio regulations by transmitting unregulated radio programs from ships on the high seas. 20 4 That the activity violates the laws
of another state does not provide jurisdiction to ships desirous of halting
the broadcasts. Therefore, pirate broadcasters register their vessels under
flag of convenience states because the flag of convenience state likely will
not make the effort to stop the broadcasts.20 5
Flag of convenience vessels also have been used to smuggle narcotics. 20 6 One might assume that the shipowners would sail under a flag of

199. See Frizell, The Pirate Whalers, OCEANS, Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 25.
200. Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716,
T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948). The prologue of
this treaty provides that the signers recognize "the interest of the nations of the world in
safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources represented by whole
stocks" and "that it is essential to protect all species of whales from further overfishing
....

"

Id. preamble.

201.

Id.

202.

See J.

KINDT,

3

MARINE POLLUTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA

1325 (1986).

203. Id.
204. See generally Note, Interference with Non-National Ships on the High Seas:
Peacetime Exceptions to the Exclusivity Rule of Flag-StateJurisdiction, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L

L. 1161, 1224-28 (1989). Pirate radio broadcasts peaked in the 1960s, but

probably still exist. Id. at 1224 n.217.
205. Id. at 1225 & n.224.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Beltran, 761 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1985) (Panamanian
vessel used to smuggle marijuana).
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convenience with the expectation that an open registry government
would remain passive in regard to on-board illegal activities. Some flag
of convenience states, however, have been accommodating to United
States requests to board vessels that are suspected of carrying illicit drugs
on the high seas.2 07 John C. Lawn, a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
administrator, noted that "since 1980, the government of Panama has
granted every request by [United States] authorities to board Panamanian-registered vessels on the high seas." 20 8 The Bahamas provides similar cooperation.20 9 Thus, registering a ship under a flag of convenience
registry does not necessarily provide an easy avenue for drug smuggling.
B.

Labor Concerns

For decades, labor forces have resoundingly criticized flag of convenience shipping. 1 0 Labor unions object to open registries because such
systems allow shipowners to circumvent the imposition of minimum
wages and social benefits that industrialized states require.2"' Similarly,
commentators condemn flag of convenience crews as substandard.2" 2 One
commentator noted that the officers and crew members of flag of convenience vessels have been, and continue to be, less competent than those
who are working for similar compensation on similar vessels under nationalist maritime flags.21 The commentator continues with the argument that the human element is primarily responsible for the navigational and other errors resulting in accidents and casualties.2 14
Maritime employment opportunities for seamen from industrialized
states have decreased in recent years," 5 and trade.union leaders blame
207. See, e.g., U.S. Foreign Policy and InternationalNarcotics Control-PartII:
HearingBefore the House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess., 113 (Mar. 29, 1988) (statement of John C. Lawn, Administrator, DEA).
208. Id.
209. Mr. Lawn noted that "[tlhe Bahamian Minister of National Security, who is
also the Attorney General, is providing forceful leadership of the Bahamian Police and
Defense Forces and is continuing to cooperate fully in joint United States/Bahamian
interdiction efforts." Id. at 121.
210. See M. STOPFORD, supra note 184, at 163.
211. For a detailed analysis of the relationship between labor forces and flag of convenience shipping, see H. NORTHRUP & R. ROWAN, THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT
WORKERS' FEDERATION AND FLAG OF CONVENIENCE SHIPPING

(1983).

212. See B. METAXAS, supra note 1, at 45.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, supra note 171, at 297. The Report of the International Labour Organization Director-General provides that "[w]ith
very few exceptions, seafarer employment in all developed maritime countries has fallen
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open registries for this decrease.21 In particular, the International
Transport Workers' Federation has waged an extensive campaign
against flag of convenience shipping that includes boycotts, litigation, and
lobbying.21 7 Furthermore, the declining job market for seamen of industrialized states is not likely to improve and probably will worsen. 218 This
employment situation is caused in part by transferring vessels to registration in flag of convenience states."' Market forces mandate that shipowners pursue the flag of convenience benefits of lower operating
costs. 220 Because labor costs account for approximately one-half of a

ship's operating costs, shipowners must employ foreign labor in an effort
to remain competitive. Use of such a labor force is forbidden by most
industrialized states.2 21
This decrease in maritime employment, however, is not solely the result of shifts in vessel registration to flag of convenience registries. In
general, the more modern ships require fewer crew members for efficient
operations than in the past.22 2 For example, although oil tankers required an average of fifty-five crew members per vessel in 1950, typical
oil tanker operations in 1980 required only thirty crew members. 223 In
the future, oil tanker operation likely will require only around eighteen
crew members. 224 Therefore, although flag of convenience shipping may
be responsible in part for the decrease in industrialized states' maritime
employment, the decrease is attributable largely to technological
advances.
C.

Safety Concerns and Marine Pollution

Opponents of flag of convenience registries also have blamed flags of
convenience for. causing environmental pollution. Shipping in general has
been cited as the main source of marine pollution. 225 Flags of conve-

sharply in the intervening years and there is little evidence that the situation is changing." Id.

216. See B. METAXAS, supra note 1, at 46.
217. See H. NORTHRUP & R. ROWAN, supra note 211, at 43-53. International
Transport Workers' Federation factions have waged campaigns against flag of convenience shipping in every industrialized maritime state and many LDCs. See id. at 13-16.

218. See id.
219. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.

220. See supra notes 183 and accompanying text.
221.

See supra notes 130, 184 and accompanying text.

222. See M.

STOPFORD,

supra note 184, at 103-04.

223. Id.

224. Id. at 104.
225. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 18, at 242. Ships present multiple
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nience however, have been singled out as a particular culprit. 22 6 To this
extent, some critics see the elimination of flags of convenience as a panacea for the ills of marine pollution.227 This ascription of blame, however, arguably is misplaced. Though highly visible, oil spills are only a
minute source of maritime pollution.2 2 Accidents at sea account for less
than five percent of oil discharged into the oceans. 22 ' By far, the majority
of oil discharged into the oceans is discharged intentionally by ships during the course of routine operations rather than by casualties to vessels. 23 0 Furthermore, there is no statistical evidence currently available

which suggests that open registry vessels are responsible for a higher
amount of the operational discharges of oil than are non-open registries.
In addition, arguing that eliminating flags of convenience would solve oil
pollution problems ignores the fact that some ships involved in catastrophic oil spills, like the Exxon Valdez, have been United States owned
and registered.
Furthermore, inferior ships can be found under all registries, not just
under open registries."' The United States still re-registers aging vessels
sources of pollution: ships may discharge oil that is mixed with bilge water; pollution
from exhaust fumes dissipates into the atmosphere, but is returned seaward via precipitation; nontankers use their fuel tanks to hold ballast water, which often will be discharged
into the sea; sewage and garbage often is deposited overboard; ocean water is pumped
into oil tanks to clean them out and then is flushed back into the sea; and collisions,
groundings, or explosions result in the discharge of oil or chemicals. See id. at 242-43.
226. See Shaw, Winslett, & Cross, The Global Environment: A Proposal to Eliminate Marine Oil Pollution, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 157, 162 (1987).
227. See id. Shaw, Winslett, and Cross conclude:
There is but one solution to the problem of oil spills, and that is the abolition of
flags of convenience registry. The termination of flags of convenience would put an
end to the causes of most oil spills-poorly trained crews and shoddy ship construction. Elimination of the less stringent safety standards under flags of convenience would greatly enhance a tanker's ability to make a voyage without running
aground, colliding with objects or other ships, or losing oil because of structural
failure.

Id. at 185.
228. The four principal sources of marine pollution are shipping, dumping, sea bed
activities, and land activities. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 18, at 242.
229. See C. SANGER, ORDERING THE OCEANS 102 (1987).
230. As one source explains:
Casualties to ships are the most dramatic, but by far the least frequent part of the
overall problem of oil pollution from ships. The tarball on your beach is far more
likely to have been caused by an operational discharge of oil from a ship than by
oil from a casualty.
D. ABECASSIS & R. JARASHOW, OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPS 7 (2d ed. 1985).
231. "[Sjubstandard ships can be found under most, if not all, flags: they are by no
means peculiar to flags of convenience." R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 18, at
207.
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that are in many cases inferior to ships found in open registries.232
United States tankers plying the waters of Alaska average 17.5 years of
age, though the shipping industry considers most ships overaged at
twenty and retires them.233 These conditions have caused significant loss
of life in recent years in accidents involving World War II-vintage tankers and coal carriers registered under the United States flag.234
In the past, open registry vessels earned their poor reputations. The
Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadiz, and Argo Merchant all were flag of convenience vessels involved in horrific oilspills in the 1960s and 1970s.
These accidents were blamed in part on poorly trained crews and in part
on the condition of the ships.2" 5 These factors arguably arose out of the
nature of the vessels as flag of convenience vessels. Because the flag state
did not have a genuine link, the fldg state could not exert effective control over the vessel so as to avoid these substandard conditions.
Recently, however, the standards under which the principal flag of
convenience vessels operate have improved. Today, maritime statistics indicate that the safety and casualty rates for some flag of convenience
states approach or even are superior to those of industrialized states.23
Statistics indicate that in the five year period from 1984 to 1989, the
casualty rates for the United States and the United Kingdom have remained relatively constant, while the rates for Liberia and Panama have
decreased.2 37 Liberia in particular has improved its standards such that
its casualty rates are less than the United States and comparable to that
of the United Kingdom.23 Panama's casualty rate is still comparatively

232. See Aging Fleet a Ticking Time Bomb?, J. Commerce & Commercial, Mar. 30,
1989, at 1A, col. 2.
233. Id. "More than 130 vessels have an average age of 19.85 years-a hairbreadth
away from being overaged." Id. at 10A, col. 1.
234. Id. "Two major maritime catastrophes in the U.S. merchant fleet during the
1980s appeared to be age-connected. The Poet, an old World War II-era vessel, sank in
1980, killing more than 30 officers and crew. The Marine Electric, a World War II-era
coal carrier, sank in 1983, killing 31 of its 33 officers and crew." Id.
235. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
236. See Appendix to this Note. Safety concerns, however, still linger. In April 1990,
over 100 people died in a suspicious fire on board the Scandinavian Star, a Danish
owned, Bahamian registered vessel. Passengers noted that fire alarms did not work and
that the Portuguese crew seemed ill-trained and ill-prepared to handle the emergency.
See 110 Die in Blaze on Danish Ferry; Arson Suspected, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1990, at
1, col. 3.
237. See Appendix to this Note.
238. Id.
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239
high, but has improved significantly in only five years.

The primary reasons for the improved safety records is increased administrative control over the vessels by the open registry states. 240 Liberia's safety inspection has been particularly effective. As noted above, its
loss rate is one of the lowest in the world, which is especially noteworthy
considering the size of its fleet. Liberia has achieved this success through
the expansion of an extensive safety program. 24 1 Panama, too, has augmented safety inspection programs and has seen its casualty rate cut in
half in the period from 1984 to 1989. According to Professor Metaxas,
"the Panamanians have made some rapid strides during the past few
years and I am confident that we will see continued progress. The Panamanian annual safety inspection program is now in place, and the number of inspections is progressively increasing. '"242
It also is likely that the improvements in vessel standards are effected
by the vessel owners, who seek to decrease their insurance premiums by
improving the standards under which they operate. Marine insurance,
and more particularly hull and machinery insurance, accounts for up to
ten percent of vessel operating costs.24 The insurers set the premiums by
taking into account several factors, including the shipowner's claims record, the flag of registry, and the nationality of the crew.244 It is likely,
then, that shipowners in open registries are motivated to improve ship
operation standards for the purpose of lowering their insurance premiums and thereby decreasing overall operating costs.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Since the end of World War II, flag of convenience shipping has endured harsh criticism. States and international organizations have focused on the lack of a "genuine link" between ships and states in their
attempts to condemn or control open registry shipping. Although nationality for vessels is essential to maintain order on the high seas, attempts
239. Id.
240. See B. METAXAS, supra note 1, at 46. "Despite some suggestions to the contrary, the roles of Liberia and Panama in exerting effective administrative control over
their maritime programs in recent years have not been mere window dressing." Id.
241. Id. "For almost ten years Liberia has been expanding and refining the legal
and professional machinery by which it exercises an effective degree of control over the
construction, equipage, maintenance, and manning of Liberian vessels. The Liberian
safety inspection program now is truly worldwide in the sense that it has 200 experienced and capable inspectors in 180 ports of 40 countries of the world." Id.
242. Id. at 46-47.
243. See M. STOPFORD, supra note 184, at 106.

244. Id.
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to impose genuine link requirements between ships and states violates
fundamental premises of international law that favor sovereignty for all
states. Furthermore, because international law is consensual by nature,
legal efforts to establish universal controls for flag of convenience vessels
have proven unsuccessful. Rather, to maintain high shipping standards,
either siates must decide individually to exert control over ships that fly
their flag, or shipowners must be motivated by factors such as a desire to
decrease insurance premiums.
Flag of convenience shipping once was an evil of international shipping. Today, however, general condemnation of flag of convenience registries is outdated and unrealistic. The blame for many of the ills that
flag of convenience vessels are alleged to promote is misplaced and unwarranted. Some registries, particularly Liberia and, to a lesser extent,
Panama, have made great strides toward improving their fleets and now
deserve a more respected place in the international shipping arena.
David F. Matlin
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